

Proposal for a Pilot Project: *Using DKIM to Create a Email Trust Channel*

Dave Crocker

Brandenburg InternetWorking bbiw.net

Roadmap

- Trust with domain names: Why do DKIM?
- DKIM authentication basics
- Reputation layer above signature layer
- A modest publishing proposal



Reputation — Using IP vs. Domain

<u>IP</u>

Pros

- Can be at SMTP time
- Lots of existing practice
- High granularity

Cons

- Dynamic
- Not portable
- Shared among senders
- ▲ Tied to machine, not org.

Domain Names

Pros

- Aligns better with org
- Long-term stability
- ✤ Less long-term admin
- Can be delegated

Cons

- Must wait for message header to be transmitted
- More complex software



Mistrust and Trust are Different

Mistrust


- Actor is typically hidden and unaccountable
- Look for bad behavior
- Heuristic results with false positives

Trust


- Actor is accountable and collaborative
- Presumes good intent
- Problems are "errors", not abuse



Trust is a separate channel



versus...



DKIM – Identify a Responsible Party

http://dkim.org/specs/draft-ietf-dkim-overview-10.html

Goals

- Compatible/transparent with existing infrastructure
- Minimal new infrastructure
- Implemented independently of MUA clients
- Deployed incrementally
- Permit delegation of signing to third parties (non-authors)

Non-Goals

- No assertions about behaviors of signing identity
- Not directions to receivers
- No protection after signature verification.
- No re-play protection
 - Transit intermediary or a recipient can re-post the message



DKIM Core Technology – RFC 4871

Authenticated identity

- DKIM-specific parameter
- From:, Sender:, intermediary, mailing list, other...

Authentication mechanism

- Cryptographic signing
- Signer chooses header fields to include [+ body]

DNS query mechanism

- Identity + selector defines query string
- Produces public key

Effort to add to origination

- Private key
- Signing module

Effort to add to reception

- Public key
- Validation module

Limitations

- Minimal robustness against mailing lists
- Relaying can break signature



Sample DKIM Signed Message

Received: from mercury.example.net (HELO mercury.example.net) ([192.168.1.1]) by mail.example.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA; 01 Oct 2008 17:11:15 +0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=example.net; s=dorrington; t=1222881075; bh=HOVyUZdDUFeesnM3UIalZgPhdeJQS6N061IKw 7iUjZ4=; h=Message-ID:Date:From:MIME-Version:To:Subject: Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding; b=kp3vRZo7CiYpOz8lQtIOTZ+W GI+Cd+te3KPLzFVopncaLnmfyNE0XToxOqSo9FZFz7an9B25gxfjZpZ80LpXmaZmtxx tikwSp0gdDJOWHUtGD2zs1osjDbRKT6KyNYb7 Message-ID: <48E3AF2E.10108@example.net> Date: Wed, 01 Oct 2008 10:11:10 -0700 From: Alice Smith <alice@example.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Bob Brown <bob@example.com> Subject: Tomorrow's meeting Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 **Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit** Authentication-Results: mail.example.com; header.From=alice@example.net; dkim=pass (sig from example.net/dorrington verified;);



Status

<u>dkim.org/#deployment</u>

- 20(!) at interop event
- 18 software; 5 service
 - Steady adoption rate

Relatively minor earlystage rough edges

 Some confusion about identity to evaluate —DKIM has two identity parameters (d= and I=)

Further work

- ADSP publish signing practices to detect messages that should be signed
- Authentication-Results header from signature validator to identity assessor

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Authentication is Useless...

• ... by itself

- We all say this, but do we appreciate what it really means?
- We often say: If you have a validated name, you can make simple decisions for folks you know.
 - ▲ After all, you already know that I'm a great guy...
 - But this means really means you've gone beyond simple authentication... into reputation.

This added layer is a barrier to adoption of authentication!

- Must have a reputation step, before an adopter gets value.
- Potential adopters of authentication are waiting for compelling and immediate utility <u>that is turnkey</u>.



Can a simple project help?

Some utility, based on authentication

Without prior sender/receiver arrangement

Goals

- Simple, useful
- Not compete with "reputation" services...
- Possibly serve as a template for others

Proposal

Published Member List (PML)





Published Member List (PML)

Pilot project

- Create an email trust domain among member institutions to permit streamlined email filter handling.
- Demonstrate utility of validated membership lists

Publish a list of a group's members

- Membership can be a meaningful "indication" of Goodness
- Might publish related attributes, like type of institution
- Assessor might interpret favorably, but not give message a free pass

Could be template for other organizations

✤ Banks, Airlines, Governments, Political Parties...

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Project Details



- Write charter for project
- Define expected use by assessment engine
- Agree on list semantics
- Evaluate legal implications
- Document and publish it

- Obtain agreements to publish
- Define DNS/VBR* query format
- Begin operation
- Document the project
- Recruit spamassassin and other users of list

* VBR: Vouch by Reference <http://www.domain-assurance.org/protocol-overview.phtml>

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Attributes in an Entry

Domain name

Associated name of institution

Member attributes, such as

- Type of institution
- * ...?



Audience Survey

Interest?

- Idea of membership lists
- Participation in pilot project
- Concerns?

