

The Truth About: Trust and DKIM

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Mistrust vs. Trust



To repeat: Mistrust vs. Trust

Mistrust

- Sender actively trying to trick receiver
- Mail is usually spoofed
- Heuristics, to distinguish valid from spoofed

Trust

- Sender is collaborating, at least for identifier
- With valid identifier is valid, assessment (reputation) not confused by "noise" of bad actors



What is **DKIM** for?

- Means a message is not spam
- Guarantees delivery
- Puts a domain name on a message
- Validates a message
- Authenticates the author or origin of a message
- Authenticates the sender of a message

What DKIM really does

- Allows an <u>organization</u> to <u>claim responsibility</u> for transmitting a message, in a way that can be validated by a recipient.
- The organization can be the author's, the originating sending site, an intermediary, or one of their agents.
- A message can contain multiple signatures, from the same or different organizations involved with the message.



Trust Service Architecture



Differential Handling, with Trust as a Component

Organizational Trust

		Low	Medium	High
Stream Risk	Low	BENIGN: <i>Moderate</i> <i>filter</i>	DILIGENT: Mild filter	PRISTINE: Accept
	Medium	UNKNOWN: Strong filter	TYPICAL: <i>Targeted</i> <i>filter</i>	PROTECTED: Accept & Contact
	High	MALICIOUS: Block & Counter	NEGLIGENT: <i>Block</i>	COMPROMISED: Block & Contact



Identifying Mail Streams

An organization has multiple "types" of mail

- Corporate
- Transactions (purchase order, order confirmation...)
- Proposals
- Marketing mass mailings
- Customer Support
- Allow different reputations to develop under different labels

- Label them with different
 DKIM d= subdomains
- For example:
 - * corp.example.com
 - * transact.example.com
 - * / bulk.example.com
 - free.example.com
 - * paid.example.com
 - * uk.example.com
 - * faculty.example.edu
 - * student.example.edu



ADSP: Author Domain Signing Practices

• Exploring <u>mis</u>trust

- Worry, if there is no signature based on From: field domain...
- Domain owner can publish practices for signing with From: field domain
- DNS TXT record under
 - _adsp._domainkey.<from domain>



Protecting Spoofed "Brands"

• ADSP protects the wrong information

- Too easy to work around
- * End users do not see From: field address

Instead, perhaps we should...

- Link brand name to domain name via registry
- For messages appearing to be from Brand, confirm From: field domain name



References

DKIM home page – http://dkim.org

- * DKIM 3-slide Teaser
- DKIM Service Overview

RFC 5585

- FAQ
- Wikipedia entry on DKIM
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 Deployment and
 Operations
- Discussion Lists

- DKIM Signatures –
 RFC 4871 + RFC 5672
- ADSP –
 RFC 5617
- Auth-Results RFC 5451

ARF – http://mipassoc.org/arf/ http://www.ietf.org/dyn/ wg/ charter/marf-charter.html



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